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A QUESTION OF PRIVILEGE:
VALID PROTECTION OR
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE?
By S. A. TACON*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is almost a tradition in dealing with the issue of professional privilege
to begin with a recitation of Wigmore's four criteria justifying a testimonial
privilege' and then, depending on one's point.of view, to demonstrate that the
arguments support or deny the extension of a privilege to medical profes-
sionals in general or psychiatrists in particular. The literature on privilege is
substantial2 and this paper attempts as far as possible to avoid repetition of
propositions presented elsewhere. Particular attention, however, is given to
the relevant recommendations of the Canada Law Reform Commission as
embodied in the proposed Evidence Code.3
Within these bounds, though, the paper presents a case for statutory
recognition of a modified privilege for mental health professionals in both
the civil and criminal spheres. With regard to compulsory psychiatric exami-
nations, it is argued that the statutory privilege should be buttressed in two
ways. First, inculpatory statements and admissions made during such psy-
chiatric examinations should be inadmissible in court either as proof of guilt
or as the foundation for the opinion evidence of expert witnesses. Secondly,
© Copyright, 1979, S. A. Tacon.
* Ms. Tacon is a D. Jur. candidate and Sessional Lecturer at Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University.
'Wigmore, 8 Evidence, rev. McNaughton (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961) s. 2285
at 527.
2 For a partial list of relevant articles, see Tollefson, Privileged Communications in
Canada (Common Law Provinces) (1966-67), 4-5 Colloque int. dr. comp. 32; Slovenko,
Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege (1959-60), 6 Wayne L. Rev. 175;
Slovenko and Usdin, Psychotherapy, Confidentiality and Privileged Communication
(Springfield: C. C. Thomas, 1966); Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privi-
lege: A Picture of Misguided Hope (1973-74), 23 Cath. U. Am. L. Rev. 649; Schiffer,
Mental Disorder and the Criminal Trial Process (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978); Orland,
Evidentiary Privileges in the United States (1966-67), 4-5 Colloque int. dr. comp. 18;
Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part H1 (1956-57), 41 Minn. L. Rev. 731;
Kirkpatrick, Privileged Communication in the Correction Services (1964-65), 7 Crim.
L.Q. 305; Kennedy, Exclusion of Relevant and Admissible Evidence-Doctors and Priests
(1964-65), 13 Chitty's L.J. 41; Hammelmann, Professional Privilege: A Comparative
Study (1950), 28 Can. B. Rev. 750; Guttmacher and Weihofen, Comment: Privileged
Communications Between Psychiatrist and Patient (1952-53), 28 Ind. L.J. 32; Freedman,
Medical Privilege (1954), 32 Can. B. Rev. 1; Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions
and the Law of Privileged Communications (1963-64), 10 Wayne L. Rev. 609; Dickens,
Legal Protection of Psychiatric Confidentiality (1978), 1 Int. J. of Law and Psych. 255;
and Baldwin, Confidentiality Between Physician and Patient (1962), 22 Maryland L.
Rev. 181.
3 1n Report on Evidence (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1975) at
13 ff. [hereinafter Evidence Code].
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several procedural changes are recommended to reduce further the possibility
of unfairness to the accused arising through the exercise of the state's powers
to order a psychiatric examination. Support for these propositions is drawn,
inter alia, from the First Annual Report of METFORS4 and interviews with
mental health professionals. 5
The format of the paper is as follows: the common law position, in-
cluding Canadian case law, is presented; arguments favouring and opposing
the adoption of a modified privilege are considered, including the necessity
for a statutory rather than common law basis for such a privilege; and the
proposals themselves are then detailed.
II. PRIVILEGE AND THE COMMON LAW
The foundation of rational adjudication in civil and criminal disputes
is the requirement that all relevant and reliable evidence be laid before the
triers of fact and law. The common law has evolved a number of doctrines
to exclude information considered irrelevant (i.e., not tending to prove or
disprove a fact in issue) or unreliable. 6 The exclusion of hearsay and involun-
tary confessions, for example, is based on the supposedly unreliable nature
of such evidence. The common law also has recognized that the judicial
policy of full evidentiary disclosure conflicts at times with other policy con-
siderations and might well require the subordination of the evidentiary pro-
cess to such competing interests. This recognition forms the basis of the
common law concept of privilege-the right or obligation of the witness to
refuse to answer questions in court without risk of the judicial sanction of
contempt proceedings.
A common law privilege has been established with regard to matters
of national security,7 as well as communications between solicitor and client
4 The Metropolitan Toronto Forensic Service (METFORS), created by an Order-
in-Council (Ontario Gazette, 1977, Vol. 110-27, OC 1417/77, at 2351) provides psy-
chiatric services to the courts of Metropolitan Toronto. The bulk of remands from the
courts are for three days and are handled in the Brief Assessment Unit (BAU) by a
team of mental health professionals including a psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker,
psychiatric nurse and corrections officer. Facilities are also available in an inpatient unit
for thirty or sixty day remands where additional time is required for assessment.
METFORS reports annually to the Attorney General. Reference is made to data com-
piled by METFORS and published in the Statistical Supplement to the First Annual Report.
5 Some of these professionals are attached to METFORS. It must be stressed, how-
ever, that the interviews constituted a random sample of opinions regarding privilege.
Nevertheless, the information as to actual practice in the BAU and the courts and
personal responses to the privilege issue were most helpful in evaluating the legal argu-
ments. The writer also was permitted to observe the brief assessment process (i.e., the
interview with the accused and the subsequent team discussion and evaluation of the
individual, including the findings to be reported to the judge). The opportunity to con-
sider the concept of privilege in the context of actual court referrals was of considerable
assistance as well.
6 The "law of evidence," of course, comprises a vast body of often contradictory
case law. See, generally, Wigmore, supra note 1; and Cross, Evidence (2d ed. London:
Buttetvorths, 1963).
7 See Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, [1942] 1 All E.R. 587
(H.L.), aff'g [1941] 1 K.B. 640 for a discussion of the basis for a privilege regarding
matters of national security.
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and between husband and wife. The rationale for privilege in the case of
matrimonial communications is based on the public interest in upholding the
marital relationship-compelling one spouse to testify to such matters would
undermine the stability of marriages. This common law privilege has been
codified at both the provincial8 and federal9 levels. The justification for
a solicitor-client privilege rests on the premise that trained legal represen-
tation is essential to a just adjudication. Absent such a privilege against
disclosure, "every one would be thrown upon his own legal resources;
deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult
any skilful person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half his case."' 0
Rather than thwarting the court's search for truth, the protection of solicitor-
client confidence thus actually supports the proper administration of justice.1
Beyond these privileges, the common law requires disclosure of relevant
testimony despite the confidential nature of the communications.' 2 Thus,
testimonial privilege has not been extended to confidences between physician
and patient, social worker and client, or priest and penitent.' 3 While acknowl-
edging that such matters may well be so confidential as to render the attend-
ing physician liable if he discloses those communications to third parties,
the judiciary has stressed that a medical practitioner is required to testify to
such confidences and violates no ethical standard in so doing.' 4
It should be noted at this point, however, that the common law position
denying a medical privilege represents a clear judicial policy choice not
paralleled in most European codes, which do recognize the special nature
of the physician-patient relationship. 15 In Germany, the privilege is that of
8 Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 151, s. 11.
9 Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10, s. 4(3). It should be noted that s.
4(2) specifies certain offences under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3;
and the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, where a spouse is a competent and com-
pellable witness. The proposed Evidence Code would enlarge matrimonial privilege to
include other family relationships but would rely on the discretion of the judge in bal-
ancing the nature of the relationship, the probable probative value of the evidence,
the importance of the question and the need for the person's testimony with the public
interest in privacy, possible disruption of the relationship and the harshness of compelling
disclosure. Supra note 3, s. 40. The "privilege," then, would be discretionary, not absolute.
10 Greenough v. Gaskell (1833), 1 My. & K. 98 at 103, 39 E.R. 618 at 621
(Ch. D.) per Lord Brougham.
11 Id. Also see Ont., 2 Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (McRuer
Report) (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968) at 817-19. The proposed Evidence Code
would codify the common law solicitor-client privilege only with respect to confidential
communications made in contemplation of litigation. Supra, note 3, s. 42(1). The privi-
lege at common law included all confidential communications except those involving
future criminal or fraudulent conduct.
12 Wheeler v. LeMarchant (1881), 17 Ch. D. 675 per Jessel M.R. represents the
locus classicus of the common law position.
13 A statutory privilege is recognized between priest and penitent in Qu6bec and
Newfoundland: Code of Civil Procedure, S.Q. 1965, vol. II, s. 308; The Evidence Act,
R.S.N. 1952, c. 120, s. 6. See, generally, McRuer Report, supra note 11, at 820-21.
14 The Duchess of Kensington's Case (1776), 1 Leach 146, 168 E.R. 175 (K.B.);
Halls v. Mitchell, [1928] S.C.R. 125 at 136-38 per Duff J.
15 See Hammelmann, supra note 2.
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the patient who may consent to disclosure.' In contrast, the French courts
have determined that the "duty of secrecy is a general and absolute duty
from which doctors cannot be freed, either by express order of the court or
by the consent of the patient.' 7 The common law in the United States does
not recognize a medical privilege. However, in 1928, New York enacted a
statute conferring a physician-patient privilege. Since then, almost two-thirds
of the states have promulgated some form of a medical privilege law.' 8
The harshness of the common law regarding medical privilege may be
mollified somewhat by the operation of two other common law doctrines:
"without prejudice" statements and judicial discretion. Many professionals
such as social workers, doctors and clergy are involved in attempts to recon-
cile marriage partners. Given the state interest in promoting reconciliation
rather than divorce, such communications have been held, even tacitly, to
be without prejudice and, therefore, inadmissible in a court of law.10 It may
well be that the courts would recognize other circumstances wherein com-
munications would be considered implicitly to be "without prejudice." 20
Judicial discretion has been utilized frequently by the courts to confer,
in practice, a "privilege" against disclosure of confidential matters where,
for example, a clergyman indicates a reluctance to testify. 21 Indeed, in one
Ontario decision,22 Stewart J. stated his clear opposition, at least in that
case, to forcing a psychiatrist to testify as to the confidential communications
of a patient. The basis of the discretion rests on rather vague criteria. In the
words of one commentator, "a judge or magistrate has a discretion to exclude
relevant and admissible evidence when it is not in the interests of justice to
admit it or when it would be unfair to one of the parties to do S0.''23 The
interpretation of such phrases and their application in the context of a par-
ticular case obviously would vary considerably according to the predilections
of individual judges.
It must be stressed that the absence of a testimonial privilege beyond
solicitor-client communications applies equally to civil and criminal cases.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to consider briefly several other
li d. at 755-56.
17 Id. at 757.
18 See Annot., A State Statute to Provide a Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege (1966-
67), 4 Harv. J. Legis. 307 at 315 for a listing of the relevant state laws. But cf. Slovenko,
Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege, supra note 2, for a critical opinion of the
effectiveness of such statutes.
19 Mole v. Mole, [1950] 2 All E.R. 328 (C.A.); Henley v. Henley, [1955] 1 All E.R.
590, [1955] P. 202.
20 The proposed Evidence Code, supra note 3, codifies "without prejudice" state-
ments and negotiations for purposes of proof of liability, although such evidence is ad-
missible for other purposes: s. 24.
2 1 Broad v. Pitt (1828), 3 Car. & P. 518, 172 E.R. 528 (C.P.).
2 2 Dembie v. Dembie (1976), 21 R.F.L. 46 (Ont. H.C.).
23 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 42. (Emphasis added.) This conclusion was based on
a line of English cases: Noor Mohammed v. The King, [1949] A.C. 182, [1949] 1 All
E.R. 365 (P.C.); Harris v. DPP, [1952] A.C. 694, [1952] 1 All E.R. 1044, 36 Cr. App.
R. 39 (H.L.), rev'g [1952] 1 K.B. 309; Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v. The Queen, [1955] A.C.
197 (P.C.); and R. v. Payne, [1963] 1 W.L.R. 637 (C.C.A.).
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common law principles operating within the criminal sphere. In marked
contrast to the protection against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth
Amendment to the American Constitution, Canadian case law bestows no
comparable general right on accused individuals. 24 However, several rules
do grant some protection. For example, the accused is a competent witness
for the defence, but not a compellable witness for the Crown.25 For pre-trial
confessions to persons in authority to be admissible as evidence, they must
be shown by the Crown to be voluntary. 20 Whether or not a statement was
"voluntary" depends upon the circumstances, but must include the notion
that the confession was free from the fear of prejudice or hope of advantage.27
The requirement that the confession be made to a "person in authority" has
generated considerable case law. At the very least, a uniformed policeman
or Crown counsel falls within the category.28 Some courts, though, have
utilized an objective test, i.e., the person who induces the confessions must
actually have the power to influence the prosecution, 29 while others have
focused on the subjective view, i.e., whether the accused believed the indivi-
dual to have such power.30
The question, then, is this: are medical practitioners or other mental
health professionals "persons in authority" for the purpose of the confessional
rule? If the answer is "yes," such admissions are not privileged, but must
be shown to be voluntary by the Crown. If "no," the statements are neither
privileged nor must the Crown satisfy the burden of proving voluntariness.
The confessions are admissible, although the individual circumstances may
raise questions of credibility. The issue is of real concern in that the accused
may be forced to undergo physical examination by a doctor, or a psychiatric
examination, or both.3 1
The courts have not resolved the matter clearly. A doctor in a public
24 Ratushny, Is There a Right Against Self-Incrimination in Canada? (1973), 19
McGill L.J. 1.
25 This principle is now codified in the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10,
s. 4(1). Section 4(5) provides that the failure of the accused to testify shall not be
made the subject of comment by the judge or by counsel for the prosecution. Cf. Evi-
dence Code, supra note 3, s. 56, which continues the non-compellability of the accused
but would permit comment on the failure to take the stand.
26 Ibrahim v. The King, [1914] A.C. 599; Pichd v. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 23,
11 D.L.R. (3d) 700, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 27, rev'g 69 W.W.R. 336 (Man. C.A.); Boudreau
v. The King, [1949] S.C.R. 262, 3 D.L.R. 81, 94 C.C.C. 1, aff'g 93 C.C.C. 55 (Qu6. K.B.).
2 7 R. v. Fitton, [1956] S.C.R. 958, 6 D.L.R. (2d) 529, 116 C.C.C. 1.
28 Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, ed. Turner (18th ed. Cambridge: University
Press, 1962) at 517; Wigmore, supra note 1, at 258-59.
2 R. v. Roadhouse, [1934] 1 W.W.R. 349, 61 C.C.C. 191 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Wilson,
R. v. Marshall-Graham, [1967] 2 Q.B. 406, [1967] 1 All E.R. 797, 51 Cr. App. R. 194.
30 R. v. Myles, [1923] 2 D.L.R. 880, 40 C.C.C. 84 (N.S.S.C.); Loiselle v. The
Queen (1955), 11 C.C.C. 265 (P.Q.Q.B., App. Side); R. v. Pettipiece, [1972] 5 W.W.R.
129, 18 C.R.N.S. 236 (B.C.C.A.).
31 The accused may be remanded for a psychiatric examination under the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 465, 547, or under provincial legislation, for example,
The Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 269 as am. by S.O. 1978, ss. 4 and 5. Further, the
Crown may order such an examination: Vaillancourt v. The Queen (No. 2), [1976] 1
S.C.R. 13, 31 C.R.N.S. 81, afl'g (1974), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 137 (Ont. C.A.).
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hospital rendering emergency treatment has been held not to be a "person
in authority." -322 Where a convicted individual was examined prior to a dan-
gerous sexual offender hearing, one court has held that the psychiatrist was
a person in authority,33 while three reached the opposite conclusion. 34 Out-
side the context of a dangerous sexual offender hearing, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that where the testimony of the psychiatrist was limited to
the mental capacity of the accused and the statements themselves were not
tendered as evidence, the issue of whether the psychiatrist was a person in
authority was irrelevant.-13 Although the Crown conceded that the psychiatrist
was a person in authority, the court, in obiter, indicated otherwise. 36 Some
commentators have concluded that a psychiatrist may be considered a person
in authority depending upon the facts in the individual case. 7
In summary, then, the common law recognizes only a solicitor-client
privilege. Communications of patients or clients of other professionals, how-
ever confidential, must be disclosed to the court subject to the exception for
"without prejudice" statements and the exercise of judicial discretion to refuse
to compel testimony in a particular case where the "interests of justice" or
"fairness" so indicate. In the criminal sphere, admissions to a professional
may be held to be made to a "person in authority" so as to invoke the con-
fession rule requiring that the Crown demonstrate that the statements were
given freely and voluntarily. If, however, the professional is testifying merely
in his capacity as an expert witness and the statements themselves are not
introduced as evidence in chief, the question is irrelevant even though the
defence may not safely cross-examine the witness without the statements
being admitted. Finally, it must be remembered that the not inconsiderable
judicial sanction of contempt proceedings is available to enforce the com-
pliance of a reluctant witness.
III. SHOULD PRIVILEGE BE EXTENDED?
According to Wigmore, there are four essential conditions for the estab-
lishment of a privilege at common law:
1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed;
2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satis-
factory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
3 2 R. v. Roadhouse, supra note 29.
3 3 R. v. Leggo (1962), 39 W.W.R. 385, 133 C.C.C. 149 (B.C.C.A.).
3 4 R. v. Johnston (1965), 51 W.W.R. 280, [1965] 3 C.C.C. 42 (Man. C.A.); R. v.
McKenzie (1965), 51 W.W.R. 641, [1965] 3 C.C.C. 6 (Alta. C.A.); Wilband v. The
Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 14, 60 W.W.R. 292, [1967] 2 C.C.C. 6.
35 Perras v. The Queen, [1974] S.C.R. 659, [1973] 5 W.W.R. 275, 11 C.C.C. (2d) 449.
36 Spence J. (with whom Laskin J. concurred), dissenting, considered that in the
circumstances and applying the subjective test, the psychiatrist was a person in authority
(id. at 673 (S.C.R.), 285 (W.W.R.), 459 (C.C.C.)). Ritchie J., also dissenting, argued
that in the circumstances (the accused was under arrest at the time of the interview
conducted at police headquarters) a voir dire should have been held to prove that the
statements were voluntary.
37 Manning and Mewett, Psychiatric Evidence (1975-76), 18 Crim. L.Q. 325 at
349. But cf. Schiffer, supra note 2, at 39-40.
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3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered; and
4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for
the correct disposal of litigation.38
A testimonial privilege, in Wigmore's view, could not be justified for
doctor-patient communications, since only the third criterion is met. 9 How-
ever, Wigmore did not apply his analysis specifically to the psychiatrist-
patient relationship. Consequently, several writers40 have accepted Wigmore's
criteria as the correct standard, but have argued that the psychiatrist-patient
relationship does expressly fulfil each of the conditions and that, therefore,
the common law ought to recognize the privileged nature of these communi-
cations on the same basis as solicitor-client confidences.
In brief, the arguments are as follows. The information needed by a
physician to treat a patient largely concerns medical facts (blood pressure,
symptoms, etc.) that are independently measurable. With few exceptions, no
stigma attaches to contracting an illness or to treatment by a physician. In
contrast, the essence of psychiatry requires extensive revelations of "hidden"
emotions, fantasies, frustrations and such like. It is difficult to conceive of
individuals entering into a psychiatric relationship except on the implicit
understanding that such confidences would be respected. The first condition
is thus satisfied. Is confidentiality essential to the relationship? The answer
here also must be affirmative. The psychiatrist is virtually dependent on the
active cooperation of the patient; testing is certainly valuable in diagnosis,
but the patient interview remains the heart of the process. In Freud's oft-
quoted words: "The whole undertaking is lost labour if a single concession
is made to secrecy." 4' The third condition is obviously satisfied for psychia-
trists as it is for physicians generally-the community has a real interest in
encouraging individuals to seek professional help in resolving mental health
problems. In the criminal sphere, psychiatric assistance may well be essential
to the proper presentation of the accused's case. The fourth condition is
somewhat more difficult to fulfil. Indeed, some have maintained that the
primary consideration must remain the correct disposal of the litigation;
privilege would operate to thwart the just and fair administration of justice.42
Psychiatric testimony, however, is essentially opinion evidence; the psychia-
trist seldom has independent knowledge of the facts.43 To protect such con-
38 Supra note 1, at 527.
39 Id. at 528. Also see Freedman, supra note 2.
40 Diamond and Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations
and Speculations (1964-65), 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1335; Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second
Look at Medical Privilege, supra note 2; Slovenko and Usdin, supra note 2; Guttmacher
and Weihofen, supra note 2; Fisher, supra note 2.
4 1 Freud, 2 Collected Papers (London: Hogarth Press, 1956) at 346, n. 1.
42 See, for example, the McRuer Report, supra note 10; and Baldwin, supra note 2.
43 Some have argued that this disqualifies psychiatrists entirely from testifying-
what the court needs is facts, not conjecture based on unscientific theorization. See
Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction (1958), 23
Law & Contemp. Prob. 650.
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fidences would sustain the relationship and not frustrate the objects of the
judicial system, but simply would require the parties to tender independent
evidence of the relevant facts.
While commentators may contend that the psychiatrist-patient relation-
ship meets Wigmore's four criteria, thereby justifying a testimonial privilege,
it is highly unlikely that the common law would be modified in this way.
Although in theory the common law is amenable to change, the pace of such
adaptations is painfully slow. Moreover, the basis of the common law is
adherence to precedent; once the judicial policy in an area is established, the
principle of stare decisis retards any fresh re-examination of the whole issue.
Any changes are more likely to be small-scale; for example, a particular
case may be distinguished from its predecessors to permit some variation
in the "rule of precedent."
Additional support for this position is derived from an examination of
the response of the American courts to state statutes granting some form
of privilege to physician-patient (which would include psychiatrists) or
psychologist-patient communications. It is fair to say that the courts have
adopted a restrictive approach to exclusionary statutes-to the point where
one writer argues that the practical protection offered by most privilege
statutes is illusory.44
First, the courts have held that the communication must be confidential.
The presence of third parties, excluding nurses who are considered agents
of the physician, negates the privilege.45 This restrictive approach has serious
implications for the practice of group therapy. The other participants in the
session are not agents of the physician-psychiatrist and, hence, destroy any
professional privilege. Presumably, those patients are compellable witnesses
as well. The amendment of privilege statutes to provide a testimonial privilege
where therapy occurs in a group setting has been recommended.4 Hospital
records that include information beyond that communicated by the patient to
the physician himself have been held to fall outside the privilege statute.47
The patient is the holder of the privilege. Even though the psychiatrist
may argue that his assessment should not be disclosed fully even to the patient,
the psychiatrist has no right to assert a privilege in his own name.48 Courts
have also developed the concept of implied or constructive waiver to reduce
further the scope of testimonial privilege. In civil suits, the "patient-litigation
44 Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege, supra note 2.
45 Orland, supra note 2, at 27.
46 Braman, Group Therapy and Privileged Communication (1967-68), 43 Ind. L.J.
93; Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants in Group Psychotherapy,
[1970] Law & Social Order 191.
47 Orland, supra note 2, at 29. Also see Springer, Professional Standards Review
Organizations--Some Problems of Confidentiality, [1975] Utah L. Rev. 361.
48 Davis, A Psychiatrist Has no Constitutional Right to Assert an Absolute Privilege
against Disclosure of Psychotherapeutic Communications (1970-71), 49 Texas L. Rev.
929; In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P. 2d 557 (S. Ct. 1970).
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exception" implies a waiver of privilege where the mental or physical condi-
tion of the patient is at issue.49 To be sure, the position has some merit in that
a patient should not be able to claim for "mental suffering," for example, and
then hide behind privilege to frustrate the defence. Privilege, like equity,
should be a shield and not a sword. Nonetheless, it should be remembered
that the patient must prove his case on the balance of probabilities and, con-
sequently, must introduce evidence supporting his claim. Expert medical or
psychiatric testimony is then subject to cross-examination.
In criminal cases, most courts have relied on several doctrines to exclude
privilege entirely where the accused has been compelled to submit to a psy-
chiatric examination.50 Such examinations are held not to violate the Fifth
Amendment because the accused "cooperated" with the psychiatrist (implied
waiver), or because the accused raised an insanity defence 5' (constructive
waiver), or because of the "physical exhibit analogy" (psychiatric evidence
is deemed "real" evidence in the same category as blood tests). A Georgia
court has held that the statutory privilege only attaches where treatment is
given or contemplated. 52 The compelled or state-conducted psychiatric ex-
amination has no such purpose. Testimonial privilege, then, does not include
this category of psychiatrist-patient relationship.
Incriminating statements or outright confessions of guilt communicated
to a psychiatrist during a compulsory examination, therefore, are admissible in
evidence against the accused. As few restrictions are placed on the conduct
of psychiatric examinations, the accused may be tricked, induced or drugged
49 This "patient-litigation exception" has been included in the Model Code of Evi-
dence (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1942) Rule 223. Also see Orland, supra
note 2, at 28; and Slawson, Patient-Litigation Exception: A Hazard to Psychotherapy
(1969), 21 Arch. Gen. Psych. 347.
50 The policy and constitutional issues involved in compulsory psychiatric examina-
tions in the United States are dealt with extensively in the following three articles:
Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychia-
tric Examinations? (1973-74), 26 Stan. L. Rev. 55; Berry, Self-Incrimination and the
Compulsory Mental Examination (1973), 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 919; and Meister, Miranda
on the Couch: An Approach to Problems of Self-Incrimination, Right to Counsel and
Miranda Warnings in Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examinations of Criminal Defendants (1974-
75), 11 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 403.
51 In the United States, state law may place the onus on the prosecution to prove
sanity if the "insanity defence" is raised. The courts argue that to permit the defendant
to raise the "insanity" issue and then to prevent the prosecution from securing psychi-
atric testimony to the contrary would thwart the judicial process. The counter-arguments
run thus: the prosecution could prove sanity through other factual evidence, the testi-
mony of lay witnesses or the cross-examination of defence witnesses. In Canada, how-
ever, the question is irrelevant since one is presumed sane until proven otherwise:
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 16(4).
5 Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 177 S.E. 2d 79 (1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 964
(1971). The judicial reasoning has been criticized as prejudicial to poor defendants who
must seek expert testimony from state-appointed psychiatrists; wealthy defendants could
afford their own psychiatrists for "treatment" and thus communications would be privi-
leged. See Loftis, Patient-Psychiatrist Privilege Does Not Apply to Mental Examination
by a Court-Appointed Psychiatrist (1972), 21 J. Pub. L. 251.
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into making implicating statements.53 In several jurisdictions, however, state
law restricts the evidentiary use of such statements; confessions are not admis-
sible upon the issue of guilt, but may properly be used as the foundation for
expert opinion. 54 One state, Colorado, has legislated bifurcated insanity pro-
cedures wherein the issues of guilt and insanity are tried separately, with evi-
dence of insanity being inadmissible at the trial of guilt.55
The response of the American courts to privilege statutes is presented to
do more than suggest that the common law and common law courts are resis-
tant to changes in the doctrine of testimonial privilege. It is argued that Cana-
dian privilege statutes, if adopted, would face a similar reception in our courts.
The American experience, then, would prove invaluable in drafting a privilege
statute by revealing points of vulnerability; while it is felt that legislation is
the only avenue to introduce testimonial privileges beyond the traditional cate-
gories, the effectiveness of the statute will depend on the precise model adopted.
Most American privilege statutes are category-specific, i.e., they grant a
testimonial privilege to physicians, including psychiatrists or psychologists.
This approach has serious drawbacks, affording both too much and too little
protection. For example, a physician-patient privilege protects many factual
communications and diagnoses that do not merit insulation from judicial scru-
tiny. Yet, a psychologist in the same state who is privy to his patient's sensitive
confidences may be compelled to testify. Conversely, a psychiatrist in a "psy-
chologist privilege" state is afforded no protection against testifying. Moreover,
the statutes fail to include other professionals such as social workers who fre-
quently have access to intimate communications. It is argued that the category
approach, i.e., substituting "physician" or "psychiatrist" or "psychologist" for
"solicitor," is an inappropriate model for broadening the common law privi-
lege. Far preferable is a functional approach that focuses on the nature of the
confidence and the relationship between the professional and the patient/
client.156
Exclusionary statutes, particularly those based on the category model,
have tended to be textually brief:
There are certain admissions and communications excluded from consideration of
public policy. Among these are: ... 5. psychiatrist and patient. ... .57
This model frequently has been criticized as too simplistic to deal adequately
with the complexities of the privilege issue.58 Recent statutes have tended to
53 Several writers have protested against the use of narco-interrogation in psychiatric
examinations because of the unreliability and inherent unfairness of the procedures. See
Macdonald, Truth Serum (1955-56), 46 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Pol. Sci. 259; and
Gall, The Case Against Narcointerrogation (1962), 7 J. Forensic Sci. 29. But cf. Dession
et al., Drug-Induced Revelations and Criminal Investigation (1952-53), 62 Yale L.J. 315.
54 See Berry, supra note 50, at 926-28 for a listing of the states so restricting the
uses of such evidence. Only in Montana is there an absolute prohibition against the use
of confessions at trial for any purpose.
55 Id. at 927.
56 See, for example, Fisher, supra note 2, who also proposes functional criteria as
the basis of extending privilege.
57 Ga. Code Ann. § 38-418.
58 Fisher, supra note 2, at 641-43.
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be considerably more lengthy and intricate in an effort to tailor privilege to
the nature of the proceedings (e.g., competency hearings, insanity defences),
and the relationship of the patient and professional (physician, psychiatrist,
etc.) .5 The following proposed model statute is set out in full to illustrate the
difficulties in drafting privilege legislation so as to deal adequately with pos-
sible ramifications of extending the common law privilege:
Psychotherapists' Privilege: Confidential Communications
(1) As used in this act, (i) "problem" means mental conflicts in a patient pro-
duced by psychological or environmental pressures, or a combination of both; (ii)
"psychotherapist" means a person skilled in the diagnosis and treatment of prob-
lems as the result of professional training in the behavioral sciences for that pur-
pose. "Psychotherapist" shall also be interpreted to include a person reasonably
believed by a patient to be so qualified; (iii) "patient" means a person who seeks
out or consents to the services of a psychotherapist in the hope of remedying n
problem. Where the psychotherapeutic relationship is such as to require the par-
ticipation of more than one of such persons, "patient" shall be interpreted as
meaning more than one of such persons; (iv) "psychotherapeutic relationship"
means a relationship which exists between two (or more) persons where one (or
more) is a patient seeking help from a psychotherapist in the solution of his
(their) problem(s); (v) "confidential communication between patient and psycho-
therapist" means such information transmitted by action or declaration between
patient and psychotherapist which is transmitted in confidence and by means
which, so far as the patient is aware, disclose the information to no persons out-
side of the psychotherapeutic relationship other than those persons reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it is transmitted.
(2) In civil and criminal proceedings, in juvenile proceedings, in legislative
and administrative proceedings, and in proceedings preliminary and ancillary there-
to, a patient, or his psychotherapist, or his guardian, or his personal representative,
whether or not the patient is a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent the disclosure of (i) facts tending to show that the patient and a psycho-
therapist have entered into a psychotherapeutic relationship, or (ii) confidential
communications between patient and psychotherapist, or (iii) communications
made in confidence between members of the patient's family and the psychothera-
pist, or between any of the foregoing in subsections (ii) and (iii) and such persons
who participate, under the supervision of or in co-operation with the psycho-
therapist, in the accomplishment of the objectives of the psychotherapeutic rela-
tionship. The above privilege shall be subject to the exceptions as provided for by
sections (3), (4), (5), and (6) of this act.
(3) There is no privilege for any communications otherwise privileged under
this act when evidence of a deceased patient's mental condition is introduced as
an issue by any party claiming by testate or intestate succession or inter vivos
transaction through or from the patient, provided that the judge finds that the
social harm done by requiring the disclosure of confidences in the particular situa-
tion is overbalanced by the desirability of disclosure.
(4) There is no privilege for any communications otherwise privileged under
this act in a civil proceeding in which the patient introduces evidence bearing on
his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense, provided that the
judge finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communica-
tions be disclosed than that the particular psychotherapeutic relationship be pro-
tected or that the social harm done by requiring the disclosure of confidences in the
particular situation is overbalanced by the desirability of disclosure. Juvenile pro-
ceedings in which delinquency is being determined shall not be included in this
exception to the privilege.
59 See, for example, the Connecticut privilege statute: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 52-
146a (Supp. 1963). Also see Goldstein and Katz Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The
GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute (1962), 36 Conn. B.J. 175.
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(5) There is no privilege for any communications otherwise privileged under
this act (i) when a psychotherapist, in the course of, or subsequent to, the diag-
nosis or treatment of the problem of the patient determines that the interests of
society and the patient will best be served by commitment of the patient to an
institution for the treatment of mental disorders, or (ii) if the judge presiding in
any proceeding finds that the patient, after having been informed that the com-
munications would not be privileged, has made such communications to a psycho-
therapist in the course of an examination ordered by the court, provided that
such communications shall be admissible only on issues involving the patient's
mental condition.
(6) A person, other than the psychotherapist, who would otherwise have a
privilege to refuse to disclose or to prevent another from disclosing any matter
otherwise privileged under this act will have waived that privilege if the judge
finds that he has (i) contracted with anyone not to claim the privilege, or (ii)
without coercion, with knowledge of his privilege, and with mental capacity
to appreciate the circumstances under which he reveals these confidences, made
disclosure of any part of the confidential matter or has consented to such dis-
closure made by anyone. Where more than one patient has participated in the
psychotherapeutic relationship, no behavior which would otherwise constitute
a waiver of the privilege within this section shall be held to do so unless all the
participating patients join in this behavior.
(7) No comment upon the exercise of the privilege shall be made, nor shall
any adverse inferences be drawn from such exercise. 6o
While the present Georgia statute errs in the direction of simplicity, this pro-
posal is manifestly unwieldy and would likely provide more hours of textual
argument than instances of privilege granted.
The question must be asked seriously: if a statute extending privilege is
so difficult to draft, is the case for extending the right to refuse to answer in
court really compelling, based on notions having broad appeal, or is it merely
a matter of status for particular professionals? Proponents of an extended pri-
vilege argue that mental health professionals should be granted a privilege
based on compliance with Wigmore's criteria. That analysis represents the
policy arguments favouring a statutory grant of privilege if the common law
does not prove amenable to such changes. It must be reiterated, however, that
testimonial privilege confers the right to refuse to place relevant evidence
before the courts. Testimony in numerous instances may be highly embarras-
sing for the parties involved, for example, in divorce cases. Words spoken to
a trusted friend may be revealed. Mere embarrassment and breach of a confi-
dence given to a professional are not sufficiently compelling reasons for ex-
cluding relevant testimony.
What of professional ethics forbidding disclosure of confidential material?
No doubt, many professionals would find forced disclosure of confidences
repugnant and unconscionable in terms of their personal integrity and profes-
sional standards. The bottom line of this argument requires the professional to
refuse to disclose what he feels are sensitive communications, regardless of the
possibility of contempt charges. Indeed, a number of professional journalists
have taken precisely this stand rather than disclose their sources. Lest this line
of argument appear to place the professional in the unhappy dilemma of defy-
ing the court or violating professional standards, at least three caveats must be
added. First, it must be stressed that the concept of privilege is not to protect
60 Fisher, supra note 2, at 643-45; for his analysis of the statute, see 645-54.
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professional sensibilities but the client/patient. Second, in practice, the courts
almost invariably respect the professional's request for permission to refuse to
answer a particular question because a confidence would be violated. Finally,
privilege statutes are not absolute. Exceptions to the grant of privilege may be
statutory, as in mental competency hearings, or common law (the patient-liti-
gation rule), but the import is clear. Competing policy arguments often call
for a revocation of privilege in particular instances. For example, in custody
cases and juvenile proceedings, the welfare of the child is of paramount con-
cern. It would be difficult to support the view that privilege should protect the
parent from disclosure of information that is directly relevant to the well-being
of the child. And, given that the privilege is not absolute, the professional may
well be placed in the position outlined above: defy the court and face the
consequences, or violate ethical standards.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has recommended a modified
form of privilege in its proposed Code of Evidence:
41. A person who has consulted a person exercising a profession for the purpose
of obtaining professional services, or who has been rendered such services by a
professional person, has a privilege against disclosure of any confidential communi-
cation reasonably made in the course of the relationship if, in the circumstances,
the public interest in the privacy of the relationship outweighs the public interest
in the administration of justice.61
Essentially, the proposal codifies the judicial discretion at common law to
refuse to admit testimony in the interests of justice or because of unfairness
to the party. The codification, however, is preferable in that statutory guidance
is provided as to the criteria for exercising the discretion. The statute recognizes
both the privacy of professional relationships and that the public has an interest
in maintaining that privacy. Against this policy position stands the competing
issue of the public interest in the administration of justice. The judge is speci-
fically directed to weigh these conflicting values in the particular context.
The recommendation represents a viable compromise on the privilege
issue. The statute would grant a privilege where none existed at common law
provided certain conditions are fulfilled. Admittedly, the decision as to whether
the criteria are satisfied remains discretionary, although in view of the general
practice in the courts, it seems unlikely that the "discretionary power" would
be exercised so as to emasculate the intention of the statute. The use of dis-
cretionary authority also avoids the drafting of labyrinthian exceptions to the
privilege where other competing interests (such as the welfare of the child)
would outweigh the arguments against disclosure, exceptions that might engulf
the exclusionary rule itself.62 Finally, the statute grants a general professional
privilege, thereby including social workers, accountants, clergymen and psy-
chologists as well as physicians and psychiatrists. By adopting a functional
61 Evidence Code, supra note 3, s. 41. Also see s. 36, which provides that a "claim
of privilege.., is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel, and no inference
may be drawn therefrom." Also see s. 37, which contemplates a right of appeal alleging
error in a ruling disallowing a claim of privilege but restricts the appeal to the holder
of the privilege. Thus, although the matter is discretionary, the right to appeal from
the ruling is specifically provided.
62 Id. at 80.
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approach, the statute has avoided a basically arbitrary decision to extend
privilege to select categories. It should be noted that this broad grant of privi-
lege is possible because of the use of judicial discretion as the balancing
mechanism to weigh the competing interests involved.
It is suggested that in civil cases 63 such a proposal would resolve the
question of professional privilege satisfactorily. In the criminal sphere, though,
it is contended that additional safeguards are necessary to protect the rights
of the accused adequately.
Two additional strengths of the Law Reform Commission proposal should
be dealt with first. The common law solicitor-client privilege is codified, albeit
with the restriction that privilege applies only to communications made in
contemplation of litigation. 4 Beyond this, the general rule regarding profes-
sional privilege would govern. The privilege is then extended to include
preparatory work:
42(2) A person has a privilege against disclosure of information obtained or
work produced in contemplation of litigation by him or his lawyer or a person
employed to assist the lawyer, unless, in the case of information, it is not reason-
ably available from another source and its probative value substantially outweighs
the disadvantages that would be caused by its disclosure.6 5
How would the section apply to an examination of the accused by a
mental health professional arranged by defence counsel? At first blush, the
information would appear to be privileged, as the examination would have
been arranged in contemplation of litigation. Presumably, an "expert witness"
engaged by the defence could be called only by the defence, although he would
be subject to cross-examination if called. On the other hand, the discretionary
authority to admit such evidence is granted; the material is to be disclosed if
"it is not reasonably available from another source" and "its probative value
substantially outweighs the disadvantages that would be caused by its disclo-
sure." In criminal cases, it could be argued that, as the Crown can compel an
accused to submit to a psychiatric examination,"6 the information is reasonably
available elsewhere and, consequently, the criteria are not fulfilled. Should this
argument fail, it could be asserted that under the second condition, admissions
or confessions should be excluded. While the probative value of such material
undoubtedly would be significant, so would the disadvantages of disclosure to
the defence-the former could never "substantially outweigh" the latter.
The general professional privilege would apply to the compulsory mental
examination in that the accused would have been "rendered such services by a
0 3 The Law Reform Commission proposal, if enacted, would govern civil cases
brought in the federal courts; the provision would have to be enacted provincially before
the bulk of civil cases would be affected.
64 Evidence Code, supra note 3, s. 42(1).
65 Id., s. 42(2). Also see Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client
Privilege: The Expert Witness (1964-65), 41 U. of Detroit L.J. 473 at 499, where the
author argues that the work product of experts on behalf of a defendant in criminal
cases should be privileged.
66 See supra note 31.
1979]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
professional person.167 Mental examinations of the accused on judicial remand
in Metropolitan Toronto are conducted by METFORS68 primarily in the Brief
Assessment Unit (BAU). The Unit utilizes a team of mental health profes-
sionals (including a psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, psychiatric nurse
and corrections officer) to conduct the examinations, although the final report
is written by the psychiatrist. Because the statutory provision is directed to-
ward function and not category, all members of the examining team could
assert a professional privilege against disclosure of certain communications.
The statute, then, would apply to compulsory mental examinations and would
include all team members. While this is necessary and laudable, it is felt that
the most damaging communications-confessions and incriminating state-
ments-would not be excluded under the privilege rule.
The test for admissibility under the provision requires a balancing of the
public interest in the privacy of the relationship against the public interest in
the administration of justice. In view of the brief duration of the relationship
(usually for three days) and the purpose of the relationship (to "examine"
and not to "treat"), it is felt that the value in the "privacy of the relationship"
would be considerably less than in the case of a patient with a voluntary
therapeutic relationship of long standing. The common law position would
confine judicial discretion to circumstances in which the evidence was of "tri-
fling" probative value and of great prejudicial effect.09 Undoubtedly, the pre-judicial effect is considerable; however, the probative value could never be
considered "trifling" in regard to a confession. Under the statute as well, it
certainly could be argued that the public interest in the administration of jus-
tice would favour the admission of a confession.
It is argued, then, that the privilege rule would not exclude confessions.
Would such statements be excluded because of other provisions in the pro-
posed Evidence Code?
16(1) A statement made by the accused to a person in authority is inadmissible
if tendered by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding, unless the judge is satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was not made under circumstances
(including the presence of threats or promises) that were likely to render the
statement unreliable, or unless the accused personally or through his counsel
agrees to its admission. 70
The first hurdle is the requirement that the statement be to a "person in
authority." As indicated earlier, the case law appears to support the position
that mental health professionals would not be so classified 7' although there is
some support for the argument that in the circumstances of a compulsory
mental examination such professionals could be so considered.72 Even assum-
ing that the BAU team were deemed "persons in authority," the statements
67 Evidence Code, supra note 3, s. 41.
68 See supra note 4.
69 R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272, 11 C.R.N.S. 235, rev'g, [1970] 2 O.R. 3 (C.A.).
70 Evidence Code, supra note 3, s. 16(1).
71 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
72 Id.
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would be admissible unless the circumstances rendered the information "un-
reliable." While this condition might well exclude a confession induced by
narco-interrogation, 73 incriminating statements made during the standard BAU
interview probably would not be considered "unreliable."
Absent the statutory proposal, if the professionals were held to be per-
sons in authority, the Crown would be required to demonstrate that the state-
ments were made voluntarily. It is suggested that there would be little difficulty
in showing this. If the professionals were not persons in authority, the state-
ments would be admissible simpliciter.
Again, assuming (and it is suggested that the assumption is unwarranted)
that the statements were inadmissible directly on the issue of guilt, the confes-
sion could be introduced as forming the foundation for the expert opinion,
either at common law74 or under the statutory proposal3 5 To be sure, "the
judge shall restrict the use of the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the
jury accordingly."' 76 However, as a number of writers77 and judges78 have
stated, "limiting instructions" are a legal fiction and fail to overcome the pre-
judicial effect of the statements. It is submitted that this statement is correct-
particularly in the case of confessions or other incriminating admissions. The
likelihood of a jury respecting the niceties of evidentiary rules and relying on
the material only as a foundation for expert opinion and not tending to prove
guilt is virtually non-existent.
The necessity for excluding confessions made during a compulsory men-
tal examination, at least in part, is related to the frequency with which such
statements are uttered. It is standard procedure in the BAU interview for the
psychiatrist to administer a caution to the accused. A typical formulation of
the caution is this:
I must tell you that this examination is not like visiting your own doctor-it is not
a private matter between the people in this room. I must write a report to the
judge about our interview and may be asked in court to reveal what we discuss
here. If there are any questions which you do not wish to answer, you do not
have to answer them.
On its face, the caution indicates to the accused that the interview is not privi-
leged-that anything said may be repeated in court. Perhaps from a legal view-
point there is nothing objectionable in using information obtained during the
interview against the accused. It is asserted, though, that there are compelling
policy arguments for excluding such material.
First, while the accused was cautioned, in every case observed, the indi-
73 See supra note 53.
74 McRuer Report, supra note 11, at 823.
75 Evidence Code, supra note 3, s. 8.
76Id.
77 Meister, supra note 50, at 459-62.
78 Krulewich v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S. Ct. 716 (1949) per Jackson J.;
Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S. Ct. 294 (1957) per Frankfurter J. See,
generally, Meister, id. for other cases in which the courts indicated that limited instruc-
tions could not cure the prejudicial effects of admitting a confession.
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vidual proceeded to describe the events that formed the subject matter of the
charge. The interviews confirmed that this response is typical. Thus, in actual
practice, the BAU team hears confessions or incriminating statements in vir-
tually every case remanded to them for examination, although the accused's
version of the events may conflict to a greater or lesser degree with the informa-
tion on the charge sheet.
Why are the accused apparently so willing to disregard the caution and
incriminate themselves? A number of factors are involved. For those truly
mentally disordered, it may be argued that the caution is at best imperfectly
understood; there is no informed consent in such cases. Moreover, the setting
likely conveys the impression of a hospital rather than a police station or jail.
After all, METFORS is physically located at Queen Street Mental Health
Centre, and the examining team consists of psychiatrists, psychologists, social
workers and psychiatric nurses-all individuals associated with the helping
professions rather than the courts. It may be quite difficult for the accused to
resist the notion that these individuals are there to help him 79 -an adversary
relationship 8° is not likely contemplated. Beyond these subjective reasons,
though, are the exigencies of the BAU interview. The team must interview the
individual, administer and evaluate psychological tests, contact significant
others (e.g., spouse, parents) for additional information, discuss the data col-
lected and write the report within one day. Furthermore, as many as four such
cases may be dealt with during that single day. Given these time pressures, the
interview assumes considerable importance as a source of facts and impres-
sions of the accused. Despite the team's best intentions to avoid discussing the
"crime," it is virtually impossible to perform the examination and ignore the
events surrounding the alleged offence. After all, that event is the reason the
accused is being examined. It is undoubtedly the most fruitful source of the
information that the team must use in considering matters of fitness, danger-
ousness and insanity.
Thus, it may be inferred that incriminating statements and even outright
confessions are made by the accused during the BAU interview. It is asserted
further that such material is not suppressed by the caution because of subjec-
tive factors (the accused's perception of the mental examination) and objec-
tive reasons (the exigencies of the BAU process).
The problem of confessions is complicated further by the results of the
mental examinations. Between June 1977 and March 1978, METFORS com-
pleted 372 Brief Assessments.8 ' The diagnostic classification system describes
the individuals examined as follows:
79 Indeed, the general attitude of the accused is cooperative. According to METFORS
data (supra note 4), Table 15, indicating the general attitude and behaviour of persons
while attending the BAU as recorded on the correctional officer's summary sheet (for
March 1978), reveals that cooperative behaviour was most common, followed by
fidgeting and anxiety. In very few instances were the individuals overtly hostile; in only
one case was cooperation refused so as to thwart the examination (Table 13B).
80 See, generally, Szasz, Psychiatric Justice (New York: Macmillan, 1965).
8i METFORS Statistical Supplement, supra note 4, Table 2.
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1. Psychoses 40.94%
2. Neuroses, Personality Disorders 50.00
3. Mental Retardation 3.15
4. Other conditions .79
5. No mental illness 3.15
6. Not given 1.97
100.00%82
While the population involved could not be described as "mentally healthy,"
only in about ten percent of the cases were the individuals certified under The
Mental Health Act.83 When the mental health of the individuals examined by the
BAU team is related to legal questions, though, the following picture emerges:
1. Fit to be granted bail 5.5%
2. Not fit to be granted bail 2.0
3. Fit to stand trial 57.5
4. Not fit to stand trial 21.5
5. Fitness questionable 7.5
6. Fit to receive sentence 5.0
7. Cooperation refused .5
99.5% 84
In approximately 75.5 percent of the cases, the accused was considered by the
BAU team as fit to receive bail, stand trial or be sentenced. 85 The results of
the inpatient unit are even more dramatic: 88.25 percent were considered fit
and only 11.75 percent not fit to stand trial.8 6 While it is true that "insanity
defence" cases may not be included under the unfitness or the certification
categories (i.e., the accused is fit and not certifiable but was insane at the time
82 Id., Table 6. Only the summary is reproduced; the actual data are further detailed,
giving incidence of types of psychoses, etc. The data only cover the period between
October 1977 and March 1978. The statistics for the inpatient population (i.e., those
on 30 or 60 day remands) are similar:
Table 12
1. Psychoses 45.65%
2. Neuroses, Personality Disorders 45.65
3. Mental Retardation 5.43
4. Other 3.26
100.00%
83id., Table 13A. The data in question cover the period from July, 1977 to
September, 1977 but the percentage appears to hold overall. As the legislation involved,
however, was the 1970 Act (supra note 31), the figure could well decrease, given the
stricter standards for certification under the 1978 Amendments.
84 Id. The data were summarized from the more detailed analysis in Table 13B;
hence the total of 99.5 percent rather than 100 percent.
85 Item 5, "fitness questionable" is used by the BAU team to refer to persons
"marginally fit" and, therefore, was included in the "fit" total.
86 METFORS Statistical Supplement, supra note 4, Table 8, METFORS Psychiatric
Recommendations Regarding Persons Discharged from the Inpatient Unit from Novem-
ber 1977 to March 1978. Also see Table 13A for the period from June to September
wherein psychiatrists indicated fitness to stand trial in 70.5 percent of the cases.
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of the alleged offence), the absolute number of such pleas is so low as not to
undermine the statistical results.8 7
Thus, it may be concluded that the majority of individuals remanded to
METFORS are returned to the legal process having made damaging admis-
sions during the compulsory mental examination and before being convicted of
any offence.8 8 The danger of this situation, stated baldly, is that a mental ex-
amination of the accused may be compelled in order to elicit damaging admis-
sions that are then tendered in evidence through the testimony of the psychia-
trist or other team member to prove the actus reus of the crime or as foundation
for the expert testimony (which would accomplish the same result in fact). It
is not suggested that such is the case at present. In fact, there is a tacit under-
standing between the prosecution and METFORS that the Crown will not
proceed with the charge unless the actus reus may be established independently,
without the testimony of the psychiatrist. In the interviews, one psychiatrist
indicated that, to his knowledge, in only two instances out of about 600-700
cases was the psychiatrist directly asked for an opinion on criminal responsi-
bility of the accused (which would include mens rea as well). In only one
instance was the psychiatrist asked in court to recount the inculpatory state-
ments of the accused made during a mental examination. 89 While the spectre
of the psychiatrist as investigator for the prosecution is not likely at present, it
must be noted that tacit agreements are dependent upon the personalities
involved and are not a sound legal foundation upon which to administer a
judicial system. Moreover, there would be no doctrinal or statutory obstacles
(except, perhaps, proof of voluntariness if the psychiatrist was considered a
"person in authority" 90) to tendering such damaging material in evidence.
Should incriminating statements made by the accused during a compulsory
mental examination be inadmissible? It is argued that the answer must be in
the affirmative. The Canadian judicial system is based on the adversarial, not
the inquisitorial, model. Fairness to the accused requires that the Crown pro-
duce independent evidence of the actus reus. The psychiatric assessment must
not become an adjunct to the investigatory arm of the prosecution. Although
there is no general right against self-incrimination in Canada,9' it is suggested
that the compulsory mental examination raises special considerations. The
foundation of the judicial system rests on several assumptions including the
notion that the defendant be fit to stand trial and not be legally insane at the
time of the offence.92 It is considered improper to try a man who cannot parti-
87 It is estimated that the defence of insanity is raised in approximately 50 cases
during a one-year period throughout the whole of Canada.
88 Where the remand is for a pre-sentence report, the danger of incriminating
statements is non-existent; the accused has already been convicted of the offence. Most
of the cases, though, do not fall into this category.
89 In that case, when the Crown indicated that it would question the psychiatrist
regarding admissions by the accused, the defence interposed that it would ask the ques-
tions in examination-in-chief. As the defence rested on an insanity plea, counsel was
not contesting the commission of the actus reus.
9 0 See text accompanying note 31, supra.
91 See supra note 23.
92 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 16.
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cipate in the judicial process, instruct his counsel or plead to the charge. 93
Both provincial94 and federal 5 legislation provide for a remand for a mental
examination; the matter of fitness or insanity may be raised by the Crown,
the judge or the defence.96
The compulsory mental examination, then, comprises an integral part of
the proper administration of justiceY7 It is contended that this valid and neces-
sary function-to assess an individual's fitness to stand trial or his mental
condition-must not be subverted. The examination cannot be justified on the
basis that the state has a right to induce incriminating admissions of the accused
through the use of a procedure ostensibly directed to other issues. Such admis-
sions, therefore, should be excluded from the evidence at trial so as to restrict
the examination to its proper purpose. Interviews with mental health profes-
sionals supported this proposal. With inculpatory statements inadmissible in
evidence, the professionals felt that the examination process would be strength-
ened. The attempted (and admittedly ineffective) caution could be disregarded
and the team members could concentrate on their proper function-the mental
assessment of the individual-without fear that they might induce a confession
and then be required to repeat that information in court. The exclusion of con-
fessions and incriminating statements made during the compulsory mental
examination, then, would not thwart the administration of justice, but would
support that system by restricting the role of the examination to the mental
condition of the accused with regard to fitness, insanity and dangerousness,
and by improving the examination process itself.
One American state that excludes such incriminating evidence is Arizona.
The relevant statutory provisions include:
Rule 11.3 Appointment of Experts
e. Experts' Reports
(1) Any expert appointed by the court shall submit to the clerk of the
court his opinion of the defendant's competency to stand trial . . .
(3) In addition, at the request of the court or of any party, with the con-
sent of the defendant, the expert shall report on:
(i) the mental status of the defendant at the time of the offense;
(ii) if the expert determines that the defendant suffered at that time
from a mental disease or defect, the relation of such disease or
defect to the alleged offense.
Rule 11.4 Disclosure of Mental Health Evidence
a. Reports of Appointed Experts
The reports of experts appointed pursuant to Rule 11.3 shall be made
93 The reader is referred to an excellent article on fitness: Schiffer, Fitness to Stand
Trial (1977), 35 Fac. L. Rev. U. of T. 1. Also see Law Reform Commission of Canada,
The Criminal Process and Mental Disorder, Working Paper 14 (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1975).
94 Supra note 31.
95Id.
901d.
97 Some have suggested that the fairest solution would be to eliminate the compul-
sory pre-trial psychiatric investigation altogether; any mental examination should be pre-
dicated upon the accused's voluntary informed consent. See, for example, Schiffer, supra
note 2, at 49-50. What of the seriously mentally disordered individual who cannot grant
an informed consent?
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available to all parties, except that any statement or summary of the de.




No evidence of any kind obtained under these provisions shall be admis-
sible at any proceeding to determine guilt or innocence unless the defendant
presents evidence intended to rebut the presumption of sanity.
b. Privileged Statements of Defendant
(1) No statement of the defendant obtained under these provisions, or
evidence resulting therefrom, concerning the events which form the
basis of the charges against him shall be admissible at the trial of
guilt or innocence, or at any subsequent proceeding to determine
guilt or innocence, without his consent.(2) No statement of the defendant or evidence resulting therefrom ob-
tained under these provisions, concerning any other events or trans-
actions, shall be admissible at any proceeding to determine his guilt
or innocence of criminal charges based on such events or transactions.98
The effect of the Arizona rules have been summarized by one writer thus:
(The expert) may testify fully and completely at any competency hearing, making
use of any data in his possession to substantiate his conclusions. At a trial of
innocence or guilt, he may only testify if the issue of the defendant's mental con-
dition is properly raised. If he does testify, he may buttress his evaluation of the
defendant's mental condition by the recital of any statements or other evidence
procured at the examination except admissions about the crime itself. In this way, the
defendant is freed from all testimonially incriminating effects of the examination. 99
It also should be noted that the rules prohibit the introduction of incriminating
statements at the trial of the charge for which the defendant was examined
by the expert and at a trial based on other "events or transactions." Further,
not only the statements but evidence resulting from those statements are
made inadmissible.
It is suggested that this model forms the basis for an additional section
in the proposed Evidence Code that would exclude admissions made by
the accused during a compulsory mental examination from being tendered
in evidence at the trial for any purpose. The accused, however, could consent
to the introduction of such statements, provided that such consent was granted
expressly at trial.100 Thus, not only would this damaging material be inadmis-
sible on the issue of guilt, but also as the foundation of expert opinion. This
latter exclusion is necessary since, in practice, limiting instructions as to the
proper use of such evidence do not overcome the considerable prejudicial
effect of the admissions. It is felt that such an exclusion would not unduly
hamper the expert in testifying as to the basis of his opinion since such con-
fessions themselves form only a small part of the grounds for his assessment.
One other procedural change recommended by the Law Reform Com-
mission should be mentioned briefly. The issue of fitness may be tried at the
98 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.3, 11.4, 11.7.
99 Berry, supra note 50, at 948.
100 This would permit the introduction of such statements where defence counsel
felt that the material would support the accused's case, for example, where the acttts
reus is not contested and the plea is insanity.
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time that the question is raised or postponed until the close of the case for
the Crown. 10 In practice, the issue is not deferred until the prosecution has
completed its case. If a defendant is found unfit to stand trial, the judge must
order the accused to be kept in custody under a lieutenant-governor's war-
rant. 10 2 Where the grounds for unfitness are permanent (as in severe mental
retardation, for example), the accused may well be incarcerated permanently
under a lieutenant-governor's warrant without having been convicted of any
offence. Postponement of the issue of fitness to the close of the Crown's case
would at least lead to acquittal where the charge is not proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. The Commission, however, has recommended that the issue be
postponed until the close of the trial.'0 3 This would permit the accused's counsel
to introduce a good defence to the charge at law (e.g., self-defence, alibi).
This proposal would defer psychiatric testimony as to fitness until the
close of the trial. The Crown would not be able to introduce expert opinion
as to the mental condition of an accused remanded for an examination for
fitness as part of its case. The postponement of the fitness issue, then, would
buttress the proposed rule excluding admissions. Where the Crown sought to
introduce expert testimony on the question of mens rea, however, the exclu-
sionary rule would be essential to safeguard the rights of the accused.
Therefore, it is submitted that policy arguments amply justify the exclu-
sion of incriminating admissions by the accused during a compulsory mental
examination (whether or not the defence has concurred in the remand for
assessment). Indeed, is it argued that such an exclusionary rule is essential to
safeguard the rights of the accused and to facilitate the proper administra-
tion of justice.
IV. PRIVILEGE: THE PROPOSALS
In light of the preceding analysis, the proposals for resolving the privi-
lege issue may be summarized as follows:
(1) In civil cases, it is felt that the Law Reform Commission of Canada
proposal10 4 recognizing a general professional privilege subject to
the exercise of judicial discretion in weighing the competing public
interests probably represents the best way to resolve the privilege
issue. The section is function-oriented, it provides clear statutory
guidelines as to the interests involved and, in contrast to some
American models, it avoids both the pitfalls of extreme simplicity
and complexity.
(2) In criminal cases, the extension of the solicitor-client privilege to
include preparatory work produced for the defence, as recommended
by the Law Reform Commission,0 5 also provides needed protection
for the accused who seeks supporting expert testimony.
101 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 543. Also see Schiffer, supra note 93,
at 7-11.
102 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 543(6).
103 Law Reform Commission, supra note 93, at 38-40.
104 See text accompanying note 61, supra.
105 See text accompanying note 65, supra.
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(3) In the criminal sphere, however, it is urged that admissions, con-
fessions and other inculpatory statements made by the accused dur-
ing a compulsory mental examination (whether or not the defence
consents to such examination) be made inadmissible in evidence at
trial for any purpose, including the issue of guilt and foundation for
the opinion evidence of experts. Such material should likewise be
inadmissible at the trial of other offences. This position is supported
by policy arguments regarding the proper administration of justice
and the realities of the compulsory mental examination.
(4) The Law Reform Commission recommendation 00 to defer trial of
the fitness issue until the close of the defence case would buttress
the proposed exclusionary rule. This procedural change, however,
would not obviate the need for the exclusionary rule itself. Where
the Crown sought to introduce expert testimony on the question of
mens rea, the proposed rule would be essential to safeguard the
rights of the accused.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the above proposals would resolve
the question of privilege in such a manner as to provide valid protection
where needed and yet not facilitate the obstruction of justice.
10 6 Supra note 103.
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